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Taxation of Unmined Minerals:
Is It Inevitable, or Is It
Unconstitutional?
INTRODUCTION
While tax proposals can, by their very nature, be expected
to create lively debate, few have created the level of interest nor
furor that has developed as a result of the recent proposals
designed to tax Kentucky's unmined minerals. Clearly, this is an
issue of major import to the Commonwealth. While there are
no simple solutions to this dilemma, it is important to clarify
the nature of the problem as it exists in Kentucky by attempting
to examine this issue without the veil of emotion which sur-
rounds it. The purpose of this note is to analyze the legal issues
raised by efforts to change Kentucky's property tax on unmined
minerals through a review of the current and proposed tax
systems and the constitutional and statutory authority upon which
such taxes are based. The political, economic, technical and
severance tax issues related to this topic-although important in
the final resolution of this tax dilemma-are beyond the scope
of this note and will be mentioned only in the context of the
legal issues discussed.
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Since Kentucky's minerals in place have been held to be real
estate and are, therefore, subject to real property taxes,' unmined
minerals have been assessed as would any other real property.
A variety of assessment methods have been utilized over the
years, including self-valuation and administration by the local
taxing authorities. Local assessment and collection efforts di-
minished, however, when these methods proved ineffective and
burdensome. 2 Finally, the legislature in 1976 removed the au-
thority of the counties and school districts to levy local ad
valorem taxes on unmined minerals and decided to increase the
See Williams' Adm'r v. Union Bank & Trust Co., 143 S.W.2d 297, 300 (Ky.
1940).
2 Stephens, Taxation of Coal Lands in Kentucky, Ky. Coal J., March 1983, at 7.
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state ad valorem levy on such minerals from 1.5 cents to 31.5
cents per $100 valuation.3 This measure was generally considered
deficient because it did not exempt those landowners having
small coal deposits, and because enforcement efforts were hind-
ered by a lack of accurate information on which to base assess-
ments and a lack of sufficient funding and staffing to implement
such a program at the state level.
4
In 1978 the General Assembly dropped the property tax rate
on unmined minerals from the level adopted in 1976 to one-
tenth 'of one cent ($.001) per $100 valuation.' Since the low level
of receipts which could be collected through enforcement of this
measure discouraged efforts at assessment and collection, it is
alleged that a de facto exemption has resulted. 6 The Common-
wealth's recent fiscal problems, combined with an increased need
for revenue for local schools, roads and other public facilities,
have resulted in the property tax on unmined minerals once
again being considered as a potential remedy.7 During the 1982
and 1984 sessions of the Kentucky General Assembly, legislation
was introduced which proposed 1P increase the ad valorem prop-
erty tax on minerals in the ground. Although both bills were
defeated,8 the issue is far from resolved, and the battle is far
from over. Indeed, proponents of the measures aimed at increas-
ing the property tax on unmined minerals have filed class action
suits in federal district court and in the state courts on behalf
See Act of June 17, 1978, ch. 116, § 2, 1978 Ky. Acts 239. This Act, S.B. 309,
amended KY. R v. STAT. § 132.200 (1976) [hereinafter cited as KRSJ. Section 2 of the
Act repealed KRS § 132.365 (1976) which had set out the procedure for assessment of
mineral properties. Section 3 of the Act amended KRS § 132.020 (1977).
1 Mueller, Push resumes for higher tax on unmined coal (sic), Lexington Herald-
Leader, Feb. 27, 1983, at D2, col. 1.
I See Act of July 15, 1980, ch. 317, § 1, 1980 Ky. Acts 1053. Section 1 of the
Act, H.B. 146, amended KRS § 132.020 (1977).
1 See e.g., Nowak v. Foster, No. C84-0057P(J) (W.D. Ky. filed Feb. 17, 1984);
Yount v. Gillis, No. 84-CI-0815 (Franklin Cir. Ct. filed June 13, 1984); Moore v. Gillis,
No. 84-CI-0867 (Franklin Cir. Ct. filed June 25, 1984).
' Childers, An Opposite View of Taxing Coal Lands In Kentucky, Ky. Coal J.,
April 1983, at 35.
1 See H.B. 549, 1982 Sess., 15 LEG. Ric. 49, 117 (1982). See also H.B. 92, 1984
Sess., 16 LEG. REc. 66, 68 (1984). House Bill 549 was not ordered to be printed. Instead,




of all property owners whose property is fully assessed. 9 The
suits seek to have Kentucky's current property tax statutes 0
declared unconstitutional as they relate to the taxation of un-
mined coal and the assessment of other minerals in place."
As with any tax proposal, there exist a variety of arguments
both in support of and in opposition to Kentucky's taxation of
unmined minerals. The bases of these arguments range from
technical to legal, economic, social, political and emotional. For
the most part, those who favor the taxation of unmined minerals
at the same rate as general real property are represented by a
variety of groups interested in bringing greater tax revenues into
the depressed coal mining areas of the state and having what
they consider a more uniform and equitable property tax system.
Those who favor this position claim that increasing the property
tax on unmined minerals would open the door for better schools
and public services in those regions of the state from which the
coal is removed.' 2 They further argue that since minerals in place
are real estate and subject to the state tax on real property, the
failure to properly assess and tax these resources represents a
violation of state constitutional requirements of equal protection
and taxation of all non-exempt property in the Commonwealth.
3
Other arguments favoring increased reliance on the ad va-
lorem taxing system focus on a variety of economic and political
issues which are generally beyond the scope of this note but bear
mention at this point. For example, an additional argument
focuses on one of the most desired goals of state tax policy: tax
exportation. Under the tax exportation concept, a state which
exports most of its coal and which produces a significant portion
of the national market is able to export its coal taxes to non-
9 See, e.g., Nowak, No. C84-0057P(J); Yount, No. 84-CI-0815; Moore, No. 84-
CI-0867. These actions challenge the statutory and regulatory scheme which is claimed
by the plaintiff class to confer a de facto exemption from property taxation upon
unmined coal.
1o See, e.g., KRS §§ 132.020(5) (1984), 132.420 (1982), 132.450 (1984).
11 Ky. CoNsr. §§ 171, 172. Section 171 in pertinent part provides: "Taxes shall be
levied and collected for public purposes only and shall be uniform upon all property of
the same class .. " Id. (emphasis added). Section 172 in pertinent part provides: "All
property not exempted from taxation by this Constitution, shall be assessed for taxation
at its fair cash value, estimated at the price it would bring at a fair voluntary sale ..
Id.
2 See Mueller, supra note 4.
I See Ky. CoNsT. §§ 2, 3, 171, 172; see also supra note 11.
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residents (in this instance to out-of-state holders of the mineral
interests and ultimately to the users of the resource). 4 Propo-
nents argue that land and mineral ownership patterns in the
Appalachian regions of Kentucky demand such a treatment since
large tracts of coal properties in Eastern Kentucky are held by
major out-of-state corporations which supposedly do not pay
their fair share for community services."
Those who oppose taxation of minerals in place at general
real property rates point out that the coal industry already pays
significant amounts to the state treasury through the severance
tax paid when the coal is removed.1 6 In fact, while the legislature
was making changes in the ad valorem system of taxation during
the 1976 and 1978 sessions of the General Assembly, it was also
increasing the severance tax on coal.' 7 To require payment of
taxes on unmined lands would create an economic hardship
which many small producers could not sustain." Opponents also
express concern over the difficulty in administering such a tax
fairly in view of the difficulty of equitably assessing the value
of unmined minerals.19 Thus, they note, the goals of fair and
equitable taxation sought by proponents of the tax are not
attainable through this method. In addition, although propo-
nents of the new tax urge that the efforts to change the current
system of taxation are aimed at collecting taxes from the large
out-of-state land holding companies for local use, many mining
leases, particularly those used in Eastern Kentucky, require that
the actual operator accept liability for all taxes.70 This would
14 See V. Wilson, Economic Analysis of a Proposed Property Tax on Unmined
Minerals in Kentucky, at 13 (Appalachian Center Research Report, Jan. 1983) (copy on
file in the offices of the Journal of Mineral Law & Policy).
11 J. Childers, Kentucky State Report (Appalachian Land Ownership Study, Vol.
III, Nov. 1980).
16 See KRS ch. 143 (Supp. 1984).
'" See Act of March 29, 1976, ch. 84, § 1, 1976 Ky. Acts 167 (codified at KRS §
143.020 (1982)) (increasing the severance tax from 41% to 4.55o); See also Act of July
1, 1978, ch. 189, § 2, 1978 Ky. Acts 596 (codified at KRS § 143.010(6) (1982)) (4.5%
severance tax was applied to the ultimate sales price less transportation-a higher price
than the mine mouth price that had previously been used).
11 See B. Bowker, remarks before the Kentucky Unmined Minerals Tax Advisory
Commission (November 1, 1984).
,9 Thompson, State. and Local Taxation of the Bituminous Coal Industry, 76 W.
VA. L. Rzv. 297, 317 (1973-74).
1 D. Vish, remarks at a CLE seminar on "How to Investigate, Negotiate &




result in the local operator paying the taxes, instead of exporting
the tax to the major out-of-state land holding companies. 21 Ad-
ditionally, the mineral industry argues that the tax would have
an adverse impact on the ability of Kentucky coal to maintain
its share of a highly competitive market. 22
II. CURRENT TAXATION OF UNMNED MINERALS
A. The Current Taxing System
Efforts during the last two legislative sessions to increase the
tax on unmined minerals, combined with the recent filing of
class action suits demanding that Kentucky's current statute be
struck as unconstitutional, reflect a growing dissatisfaction with
Kentucky's current mineral taxation system. At present, Ken-
tucky Revised Statutes (KRS) section 132.020(5) provides for the
taxation of "[u]nmined coal and any interest therein, in whatever
form ... held, .. . at the rate of one-tenth of one cent ($.001)
per one hundred dollars of assessed value. ' 23 Although actual
.implementation of the current law is left to local officials,2 local
jurisdictions are prohibited from levying taxes on the unmined
minerals since only the state has such authority under present
law. 25
Administration of Kentucky's property tax system is the
responsibility of the Kentucky Revenue Cabinet26 with the Sec-
retary of the Revenue Cabinet having supervisory authority over
local property valuation administrators and the power to insure
that "fair and just valuation and assessment of property
' 27
occurs in accordance with state law. 28 Responsibility for the
actual assessment of the mineral properties at fair cash value,
however, lies with the local property valuation administrators.29
21 Stephens, Ky. Coal J., March 1984, at 7.
11 See Bowker, supra note 18.
" This rate was established by the 1978 session of the Kentucky General Assembly.
See KRS § 132.020(5) (1984).
- See KRS § 132.420(1) (1982).
See KRS § 132.200(11) (1984).
See KRS § 131.130(l) (1982).
- KRS § 131.140(3) (1982).
See Allphin v. Gutler, 619 S.W.2d 483, 484 (Ky. 1981).
See KRS § 132.450(1) (1984).
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This system of property taxation was designed to meet re-
quirements for the ad valorem tax imposed by the Kentucky
Constitution." Since these constitutional provisions serve as the
basis for many of the issues which have been raised during the
battle over the tax on unmined minerals, they should be exam-
ined in more detail. For example, section 171 establishes the
state property tax and provides the General Assembly with the
authority to levy taxes to cover state expenses. The section also
states that taxes "shall be uniform upon all property of the same
class ... and all taxes shall be levied and collected by general
laws.i ' 3l The section was later amended to also grant the General
Assembly the "power to divide property into classes and to
determine what class or classes of property shall be subject to
local taxation. ' 32
While the legislature may vary the rate of taxation according
to requirements33 within certain limitations, it has no discretion
to decide which property to tax. This section of the constitution
has been held to be self-executing and to require that all prop-
erty, unless constitutionally exempted, be assessed and taxed.
34
Property may be exempted from the ad valorem tax only if it
falls within the exclusions provided in section 170.31 The legis-
Ky. CONST. § 171; see supra note 11.
31 Id.
32 Id.
" See Greene v. Louisville & Interurban R.R. Co., 244 U.S. 499, 516 (Ky. 1917).
' See Reeves v. Island Creek Fuel, 230 S.W.2d 924, 929 (Ky. 1950). See also KY.
CONST. § 170 which, when read with §§ 172, 174, and 175, requires this interpretation.
" Ky. CoNsr. § 170 specifies:
There shall be exempt from taxation public property used for public
purposes; places actually used for religious worship, with the grounds
attached thereto and used and appurtenant to the house of worship, not
exceeding one-half acre in cities or towns, and not exceeding two acres in
the country; places of burial not held for private or corporate profit,
institutions of purely public charity, and institutions of education not used
or employed for gain by any person or corporation, and the income of
which is devoted solely to the cause of education, public libraries, their
endowments and the income of such property as is used exclusively for
their maintenance; all parsonages or residences owned by any religious
society, and occupied as a home, and for no other purpose, by the minister
of any religion, with not exceeding one-half acre of gound in towns and
cities and two acres of ground in the country appurtenant thereto; house-
hold goods of a person used in his home; a homestead, which is a single-
unit residential property maintained by the owner, who is sixty-five years
of age or older, as his personal residence, up to the. assessed valuation of
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lature does, however, have the power to restrict the taxation of
certain classes of property to the state level, prohibiting any
taxation at a local level;36 unmined minerals have historically
received such treatment.3 7 Therefore, by restricting taxation to
the state level and then imposing an extremely low tax rate, a
legislature may in effect adopt taxation policies which result in
de facto exemptions for classes of property-including unmined
minerals. 8
The legislative power to classify property has repeatedly been
the subject of litigation resulting in judicial delineation of valid
legislative classifications. The Kentucky courts have indicated on
numerous occasions that the manner of classifying property for
taxation is to be left to the legislature 9 and that such statutory
classifications are presumed valid. This presumption "can be
overcome only by the most explicit demonstration that a classi-
fication is a hostile and oppressive discrimination against partic-
ular persons and classes.'' 4° The courts have even gone so far as
sixty-five hundred dollars on said residence and contiguous real property,
except for assessment for special benefits; crops grown in the year in which
the assessment is made, and in the hands of the producer; and all laws
exempting or omitting property from taxation other than the property
above mentioned shall be void. The General Assembly may authorize any
incorporated city or town to exempt manufacturing establishments from
municipal taxation, for a period not exceeding five years, as an inducement
to their location.
See Martin v. High Splint Coal Co., 163 S.W.2d 711, 714-716 (Ky. 1937). This
case involved the interpretation of §§ 171 and 170 of the Kentucky constitution, and
made it clear that, while the legislature had the power to classify property for tax
purposes, it had no power to exempt property from state taxation. The legislature could,
however, exempt property from local taxation.
37 See KRS § 132.200(12) (1984).
m Critics of the current system allege:
The Kentucky legislature has granted unmined coal a de facto exemption
from property taxation. This was accomplished, inter alia, by lowering the
tax on unmined coal to a rate so low that it is uneconomical and impractical
to collect the tax. As a result of the de facto exemption of unmined coal
from property taxation, Property Valuation Administrators do not engage
in any significant efforts to ensure that unmined coal is on the tax rolls
and that it is properly assessed.
Nowak v. Foster, No. C84-0057P(J) (W.D. Ky. filed Feb. 17, 1984), Plaintiffs' Com-
plaint at 11.
19 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Walsh's Trustee, 117 S.W. 398, 399 (Ky. 1909).
,o Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U.S. 83, 88 (1940). The Madden Court made it clear
that the legislature enjoys wide discretion and freedom in the classification of property
for tax purposes. This case involved a challenge of a tax on a decedent's bank deposits.
The Court upheld as consistent with the privileges and immunities, due process and
equal protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment a statute by which the state taxed
deposits in banks outside Kentucky at fifty cents (50) per hundred dollars ($100) and
deposits in banks within the state at ten cents (10) per hundred dollars ($100).
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to state that in determining the constitutional validity of a sta-
tutory classification for tax purposes, every doubt must be re-
solved in favor of the statute before declaring it invalid.4 ' As
the court in Department of Revenue v. Spaulding Laundry &
Dry Cleaning Co. 42 noted:
In the field of taxation (as in other areas), the legislature may
make classifications, and the constitutional limitations prohibit
only such classifications as are arbitrary and unreasonable in
having no fair and substantial relation to the permissible gov-
ernment purposes of the legislation. 43
The courts have also indicated that judicial power will not be
used to usurp the function of the legislative branch of govern-
ment in this regard. 44
In determining the validity of such statutory classifications,
the Kentucky courts have required that the legislative tax clas-
sification have a reasonable relation to some permitted govern-
mental end, 45 that "[t]he difference upon which the classification
is based ... be substantial, natural and reasonable," 46 and that
See Kentucky Tax Comm'n v. Lincoln Bank & Trust Co., 245 S.W.2d 950, 951
(Ky. 1952).
2 436 S.W.2d 522, 523 (Ky. 1968), appeal dismissed, 396 U.S. 2 (1969).
3 Spaulding Laundry, 436 S.W.2d at 523. But see Burge v. Marcum, 394 S.W.2d
908, 910 (Ky. 1965). Burge involved an equal protection challenge to a state-imposed
tax on the transfer of a Kentucky corporation's stock owned by a decedent who had
been domiciled in Guatemala. The statute subjected transfer of shares in corporations
organized under Kentucky law and belonging to persons domiciled in foreign countries
to a special tax. The court held that the statute unjustifiably discriminates against United
States citizens domiciled in foreign countries, thus violating the uniformity clause of the
Kentucky constitution and the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.
This case makes it clear, however, that neither the uniformity clause nor the fourteenth
amendment prevent the legislation from setting up reasonable classifications for tax
purposes. Id. at 910.
" See, e.g., Lincoln Bank & Trust Co., 245 S.W.2d at 951; Madden, 309 U.S. at
88. These cases address the separation of powers doctrine and reiterate the notion that
a court's power should not be used to usurp the function of the legislative branch of
government regarding the classification of property for taxation purposes.
41 See Western & Southern Life Ins. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 451 U.S.
648, 668 (1981). The test, as applied to both state and federal constitutional challenges
related to taxation and a variety of economic and social legislation, requires that a
classification must not be unreasonable or arbitrary.
City of Louisville v. Koehler, 264 S.W.2d 80, 84 (Ky. 1954).
[VOL. 1:97
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the classification be uniform. 47 While such an interpretation
grants the legislature extremely broad discretion in making clas-
sification determinations, the reasonable relation limitation has
occasionally been exceeded, resulting in an unconstitutional clas-
sification. In Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co. v. Kentucky
Tax Comm.,48 for example, the court held that differences in
number only or in the methods of conducting business were not
sufficient to justify classification for the purpose of taxation.
4 9
More recently the courts have noted that the "legislative body
may not, without some rational basis, select a certain type of
business and impose upon it a substantially heavier tax than that
imposed upon other businesses which fall within the same general
classification." 50
Classification of property on the basis of ownership and
"not by reason of any qualities inherent in the property itself,"
has been held an unconstitutional ground for exempting property
from local taxation.5' Classification of property based on own-
ership failed to pass federal constitutional muster almost one
hundred years ago when the U.S. Supreme Court, in McHenry
v. Alford,5 2 held:
Such classifications for the purpose of taxation of property
run afoul of the U.S. Constitution which provides equal pro-
tection of the law for all persons, whether corporate or indi-
vidual, resident or non-resident.
[P]roperty of the same kind under the same conditions and
' The purpose of the uniformity requirement is to insure uniform rates of taxation
(not to be confused with uniform standards of assessment for taxation guaranteed under
§ 172 of the Kentucky constitution). Parrent v. Fannin, 616 S.W.2d 501, 503 (Ky. 1981).
To be uniform under the requirements of § 171, taxation must bear equally upon all
property within the taxing jurisdiction. Beacon Liquors v. Martin, 131 S.W.2d 446 (Ky.
1939); Lang v. Commonwealth, 226 S.W. 379 (Ky. 1920). All like property that is subject
to a tax must pay the same rate for the same period or the result will not be uniform.
Cummins v. Ryan's Ex'r., 104 S.W. 727 (Ky. 1907).
128 S.W.2d 581 (Ky. 1938).
Id. at 588.
City of Lexington v. Motel Developers, Inc., 465 S.W.2d 253, 257 (Ky. 1971).
" Inter-county Rural E. Co-operative Corp. v. Reeves, 171 S.W.2d 978, 982 (Ky.
1934). This case addressed the issue of the legislature's authority to classify property for
tax purposes, the constitutional requirement of uniformity and how classification of
property by reason of its ownership defeats the purpose of the uniformity provision.
52 168 U.S. 651 (1898).
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used for the same purposes cannot be divided into different
classes for purposes of taxation and taxed by a different rule
simply because it belongs to different owners. 3
Section 172 of the Kentucky Constitution also establishes
certain requirements for Kentucky's property tax system wherein
all property must be assessed at fair cash value. 4 Specifically,
the section provides that all non-exempt property "shall be
assessed for taxation at its fair cash value at the price that it
would bring at a voluntary sale."" 5 Equality of taxation is the
principal reason for adopting fair cash value as the standard for
valuation. 56 The Kentucky courts have consistently held that in
fixing the value of property for taxation purposes, the criterion
to be used is the fair cash value on the date of assessment., As
the court in Helman v. Ky. Board of Tax Appeal stated:
"[regardless of the manner or method used, valuation must be
at fair cash value, estimated at the price it would bring at a
voluntary sale." ' 59 Furthermore, since the failure of public offi-
cials to assess all classes of property at fair cash value has been
held to be a denial of equal protection,6 'the assessment must
"1 Id. at 666.
" See Ky. CoNsT. § 172; see also supra note 11.
" KRS § 132.190(3) (1984).
See Greene v. Louisville & Interurban R.R. Co., 244 U.S. 499, 516 (Ky. 1917).
Fair cash value is defined as the amount property would bring at a voluntary sale on
the assessment date. Kentucky River Coal Corp. v. Knott County, 59 S.W.2d 1002 (Ky.
1933), and the value is "the price which would be agreed upon by a party who desired
to, but was not compelled to buy it and an owner who desired to, but was not compelled
to sell it." Kenmont Coal Co. v. Perry County Bd. of Supervisors, 91 S.W.2d 47, 51
(Ky. 1936).
Where there is no available purchaser, other factors may be considered to determine
the fair cash value. For example, the value may be determined by considering the
potential net revenue of a business, its prospects for continuation and the length thereof,
the material on hand to be produced and the physical condition of the properties. Carr's
Fork Coal Co. v. Perry County Bd. of Supervisors, 93 S.W.2d 359 (Ky. 1936). In the
absence of a market for the property, the estimates of value must be based on theories
derived from the various elements that enter into valuation. Grant County Fiscal Court
v. McGee, 582 S.W.2d 69, 72 (Ky. 1979).
s See Atlantic States Coal Corp. v. Letcher County, 55 S.W.2d 408 (Ky. 1932).
554 S.W.2d 889 (Ky. 1977).
Id. at 891, quoting Floyd County v. Kentucky-West Virginia Gas Co., 407
S.W.2d 721, 721 (Ky. 1966). These cases make it clear that the particular method of
assessing property for the purpose of property taxation is not the critical issue so long
as the property is ultimately valued at its fair cash value. See supra note 53.
61 See McDevitt v. Luckett, 391 S.W.2d 700, 701 (Ky. 1965).
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be at 100 percent of the fair cash value and not at some lesser
percentage.
61
B. Challenges to the Current System
Although it is relatively simple to describe the state's prop-
erty tax system in basic terms and to define the various consti-
tutional standards and principles upon which the system is based,
the waters begin to muddy rather quickly when an attempt is
made to apply these standards to the current taxing scheme. For
example, it is clear that all property in the state is subject to
property tax unless specifically exempted by section 170 of the
state's constitution. 62 Among property exempted from taxation
are public property; certain property used for religious, educa-
tional, or charitable purposes; household goods; crops; and res-
idences of elderly and disabled persons. 63 Since minerals in place
are clearly not among those properties listed, unmined minerals
must be assessed and taxed in much the same manner as other
non-exempt property. Currently, property taxation for unmined
coal specifies that a minimal tax is to be assessed against all
interests in unmined coal" although these taxes may not be
assessed at the local level. 6  Other minerals such as oil and
natural gas, however, are not within the scope of these unmined
coal provisions and thus appear to fall within the general cate-
61 Russman v. Luckett, 391 S.W.2d 694, 699 (Ky. 1%5). Kentucky's highest court
clearly established that positive compliance with the constitutional provision requiring
assessment of property would be required, commencing January 1. 1966. The court
specified that all assessments were to be at 100 percent of fair cash value. Prior to this
case, it had been customary to assess property at percentages ranging from 12.5 to 33
percent of such value.
See Ky. CONST. J 171, supra note 11; see also KRS 132.190 (1984).
K'y. CoNsTr. § 170, supra note 34.
See KRS § 132.020(5) (1984). This section provides that: "Unmined coal and
any interest therein, in whatever form held, including, but not limited to, leasehold and
royalty interests shall be taxed at the rate of one-tenth of one cent (S.001) per one
hundred dollars ($100) of assessed value."
- KRS § 132.200(12)(1984). This provision prohibits local assessment against in-
terest in unmined coal. "T]he following classes of property ... shall be subject to
taxation for state purposes only: * * * (12) On and after January 1, 1977, the assessed
value of unmined coal shall be included in the formula contained in KRS § 132.590(2)
in determining the amount of county appropriation to the office of the property valuation
administrator .... ." See also Ky. CoNsT. J 171 which expressly provides: "The General
Assembly shall have power to divide property into classes and to determine what classes
of property shall be subject to local taxation."
19851
JOURNAL OF MinRAL LAW & PoLIcY
gory of real property which is taxed at the higher rate of $.315
per $100 in value. 66
Although responsibility for implementing and enforcing all
of Kentucky's tax laws lies with the Revenue Cabinet, 67 actual
responsibility for the implementation of the taxing scheme at
the local level rests with the local property valuation administra-
tors whose duty it is to ensure that all non-exempt property is
properly assessed and included on the tax rolls." Unfortunately,
the extent to which these responsibilities are actually carried out
in the assessment of minerals in place is frequently inconsistent
from county to county. Critics of the present system allege that
numerous holders of minerals in place are not paying property
tax on their interests because the state has created a de facto
exemption as to coal in place. They further maintain that prop-
erties held by both coal and oil and gas interests are systemati-
cally and routinely underassessed.6 9 The systematic underassess-
ment of coal, oil and gas interests may result from a number
of factors including: a lack of training on the part of the
property valuation administrators; a lack of staff and resources
to properly assess the property; a number of political concerns;
an under utilization of available sales and market data for
making valuations; a lack of reassessment of such properties
after state valuation laws have been changed; and, finally, a
lack of technical assistance given by the Revenue Cabinet to
the local property valuation administrators. 0
Critics have further argued that state and local tax admin-
istrators are violating the equal protection clauses of the federal
and state constitutions by enforcing a statutory and regulatory
scheme which confers upon unmined coal a de facto exemption
from property taxation. 7' The equal protection clauses provide
- KRS § 132.020(1) (1984).
-7 KRS § 132.020 (1984).
- KRS § 132.420(1) (1982) sets forth the duties of the property valuation admin-
istrator:
The property valuation administrator shall, subject to the direction, instruc-
tion and supervision of the department of revenue, make the assessment
of all property in his county except as otherwise provided, prepare property
assessment records, and have such other powers and duties relating to
assessment as may be prescribed by law or by the department.
' Nowak, No. C84-0057P(J) at 11-12.
0 Id. at 10.
71 Id. at 12.
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that persons in similar circumstances must be treated similarly 2
in the exercise of state powers which affect the individual or his
property, including the power of taxation.7" The state constitu-
tion, however, prohibits violations of equal protection principles
and requires enforcement of performance by the taxing author-
ities rather than creating further exemptions.
7 4
Since unmined coal and any interest therein, in whatever
form held, is real estate, "taxation thereof at a rate which
amounts ... to a de facto exemption is contrary and offensive
to Section 171 and other sections of the Constitution of Ken-
tucky which, inter alia, provides that taxation 'shall be uniform
upon property of the same class. . .. , -17 Critics allege that the
current tax on unmined coal is not uniform within the meaning
of section 171 and is therefore unconstitutional.
76
C. Support for the Current System
The Kentucky constitution has no specific provision regard-
ing ad valorem taxation of unmined minerals other than the
* general requirement that minerals in place be assessed and taxed
at fair cash value.77 The power to set tax rates and to define the
classes of property which are subject to those rates is clearly
within the decision-making authority of the General Assembly.
78
72 See Ky. CONST. § 2. Equal protection is guaranteed by the Kentucky Constitution
as follows: "Absolute and arbitrary power over the lives, liberty and property of freemen
exists nowhere in a republic, not even the largest majority."
7 Louisville Gas & Elec. Co., 277 U.S. at 37. This case declared a property tax
constitutionally invalid because it violated the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment of the U.S. Constitution. The tax was based on a classification determined
by the time within which the indebtedness secured by a mortgage was to be paid. The
court determined the classification resulted in the taxation of some, while under circum-
stances identical in all respects save taxable value, others were entirely exempt. The
opinion sets forth a standard equal protection analysis.
- See Standard Oil Co. v. Boone County Bd. of Supervisors, 562 S.W.2d 83, 84-
85 (Ky. 1978). This case addresses equal protection issues associated with the ad valorem
taxation of leasehold interests.
71 Yount v. Gillis, No. 84-CI-0815 (Franklin Cir. Ct. filed June 13, 1984), Plain-
tiff's Complaint, at 5.
- Id. at 6.
" Ky. CoNsr. §§ 171 and 172, supra note 11.
78 The General Assembly has a great deal of discretion in classifying property for
taxation purposes and in setting tax rates. See supra notes 33-48 and accompanying text.
For example, property tax rates in Kentucky vary from a low of S.001 upon each $100.00
of value, up to $.315 upon each $100.00 of value. See KRS §§ 132.020(1) and (2) (1984).
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The courts have noted on numerous occasions that "it is not
for the courts to determine the wisdom and policy of a legislative
enactment, that being the exclusive function of the legislative
body." 7' Furthermore, "[i]n the absence of an applicable con-
stitutional provision, the legislature alone determines the state's
public policy through its enactments." s
The Kentucky General Assembly has made a policy decision
to allow favorable property tax treatment to owners of coal
interests in order to rectify some of the inherent inequities in
administering the tax and to prevent excessive taxation of the
coal 'industry. While Kentucky legislative history is not docu-
mented, observers have stated:
By imposing a severance tax on mined coal and other
minerals, and lowering the tax on unmined coal reserves in
1978, the Kentucky legislature clearly expressed its intention
that coal and other minerals should be primarily taxed in this
state through the severance tax rather than through the ad
valorem property tax. This determination was made in large
part because of inherent difficulties in measuring and valuing
unmined mineral reserves.8'
Similar favorable tax treatment has been given to other sec-
tors of Kentucky's economy, such as manufacturing and agri-
culture.82 Nonetheless, the legislature's attempts in 1976 to
alleviate the burden of double taxation of the coal industry by
71 Tipton v. Tipton, 217 S.W.2d 799, 800 (Ky. 1949).
10 Kentucky State Fair Bd. v. Fowler, 221 S.W.2d 435, 439 (Ky. 1949).
'1 Nowak, No. C84-0057P(J), Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, at 3-4.
n "The fact that a statute discriminates in favor of certain classes does not make
it arbitrary, if the discrimination is founded upon a reasonable distinction." Second
Street Properties, Inc. v. Fiscal Court of Jefferson County, 445 S.W.2d 709, 713 (Ky..
1969), citing Williams v. Bowling Green, 70 S.W.2d 967, 968 (Ky. 1934). See also
Reynolds Metal Co. v. Martin, 107 S.W.2d 251 (Ky. 1937), appeal dismissed, 302 U.S.
646 (1937). KRS § 132.020(1) (1984), for example provides favorable treatment of
agricultural products by imposing a rate of "one and one-half cents (1-1/2) upon each
one hundred dollars ($100) of value of all tobacco" and the same rate for "unmanu-
factured agricultural products." The section also provided for "one-tenth of one cent
(S.001) upon each one hundred dollars ($100) of value of all farm implements and farm
machinery owned by a person actually engaged in farming and used in his farm opera-
tions, one-tenth of one cent (S.001) upon each one hundred dollars ($100) of value of
all livestock and domestic fowl." Id. Furthermore, the statute taxes manufacturing at a
rate of "fifteen cents (15) upon machinery and products in the course of manufacturing,
of individuals or corporations actually engaged in manufacturing, and their raw material
actually on hand at their plant for purpose of manufacture." Id.
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decreasing the ad valorem tax in favor of an increased severence
tax met with close scrutiny and criticism, regardless of the fact
that the result was simply to shift the methods by which dollars
were obtained from the coal industry. In response to charges
that the rate applied to coal interests is unconstitutional because
it is significantly lower than the rate applied to surface estates
and other classifications of real and personal property, it need
only be noted that an identically low rate is applied to farm
machinery and livestock, as well as machinery and products used
in the course of manufacture.8 3 The constitution "does not com-
pel the adoption of an iron rule of equal taxation, or discretion
in the ... classification for taxation of properties.'"'
Classification of property for taxation purposes need only
be natural, reasonable and substantial. 5 Therefore, it might be
argued that a different rate based on the natural differences
between a surface estate and the underlying coal interests is
reasonable and supported by substantial reasons. Such an ar-
gument is especially appealing in light of the Kentucky courts
having consistently upheld statutory classifications based on dif-
ferences less substantial than the difference between a mineral
estate and a surface estate.M Further support may by found in
a Montana decision which held that the use to which property
is devoted and its productivity is the "measuring stick in deter-
mining its proper classification, '"87 and that property may be
classified for the purposes of taxation, where, "by reason of
differences in the use and productivity ... a substantial reason
exists for such classifications." 8 1
KRS § 132.020 (1984). See also KRS § 132.202(1) (1984); and see supra note
82.
, Second Street Properties, 445 S.W.2d at 713, citing Williams v. City of Bowling
Green, 70 S.W.2d 967, 968 (1934).
" See generally City of Lexington v. Motel Developers, Inc., 465 S.W.2d 253 (Ky.
1971).
. For example, "differences in organization, management, and type of business
may be sufficiently substantial to justify classification." Motel Developers, Inc., 465
S.W.2d at 257, citing Williams v. City of Bowling Green, 70 S.W.2d 967 (Ky. 1934).
Furthermore, since "differences in... type of business" is a sufficient justification for
classifying coal separately from other unmined minerals, oil or natural gas, it could be
argued that the difference between surface and mineral estates are sufficiently substantial
to justify such a distinction.
r, See Bank of Miles City v. Custer County, 19 P.2d 885, 887 (Mont. 1933); 1
C.ooiLax oN TAXATION (4th ed.) § 335, p. 717; see also McHenry, 168 U.S. at 666.
- Bank of Miles City, 19 P.2d at 888.
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Another factor to be considered is the clear indication that
the "[state] Legislature has all power except where restricted by
federal or state constitutions.''" Such legislative actions are pre-
sumed valid, and the courts are hesitant to usurp legislative
power in this area, especially "where it is not clear that the
constitution has been invaded." 9 Finally, the courts do not
inquire into the motives behind legislation. 9' The general rule
stated by the courts is that where the constitutionality of legis-
lation is to be determined by the courts, any reasonable doubt
must be resolved in favor of the legislative action, and the act
sustahied. 92
III. LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS
During both the 1982 and the 1984 sessions of the Kentucky
General Assembly, efforts were undertaken to remove from the
state's property tax statute those sections allowing favorable
treatment for unmined coal and, further, to specify a tax rate
for all unmined minerals at the same level as other forms of
real property. 93 Although there were a number of different pro-
posals introduced during these years, and although some differ-
ences exist between the various proposals, the general focus of
the bills was similar.
A. Summary of House Bill 92
House Bill 92, which was introduced during the 1984 session
of the Kentucky General Assembly, included a variety of pro-
See Gaines v. O'Connell, 204 S.W.2d 425, 429 (Ky. 1949).
Harrod v. Meigs, 340 S.W.2d 601, 604-06 (Ky. 1960).
91 Adams v. City of Richmond, 340 S.W.2d 204, 206 (Ky. 1960), citing City of
Louisville v. Bryan S. McCoy, Inc., 286 S.W.2d 546 (Ky. 1956).
Harrod, 340 S.W.2d at 606.
- See KRS § 132.020(5) (1984). Section 2 of H.B. 549 (1982) would have amended
this section to tax any interest in unmined minerals in excess of one hundred (100) acres
"at the same rate applicable to other real property." KRS § 132.200(11) (1984). Section
3 of H.B. 549 (1982) would have amended KRS § 132.200(11) to read:
On and after January 1, 1983, the assessed value of all interests in unmined
minerals, as defined in KRS 132.010 shall be included in the formula
contained in KRS 132.590(2) in determining the amount of county appro-
priation to the office of the property valuation administrator.
See H.B. 92 (1984); see also supra note 8. Section 2 of H.B. 92 would have repealed
KRS § 132.020(5) which provides the tax rate for unmined coal. See supra text accom-
panying note 23. Section 3 of H.B. 92 would have amended. KRS § 132.200(11) precisely




visions which would have defined the nature of the property tax
on unmined minerals and which would have specified a tax rate
for such properties equal to that applied to other forms of real
property.9 In essence, the proposed changes to KRS Chapter
132 attempted to raise the tax rate on minerals in place up to
the level applied to surface estates. The proposed legislation
attempted to do this through a variety of amendments to KRS
Chapter 132. In the property tax statute's definition section,
"real property" would have been redefined by this proposal to
include "unmined minerals, oil, natural gas, and natural gas
liquids." 9 This redefinition would have required unmined min-
erals to be treated as real property additions to the tax rolls.9
The inclusion of oil, natural gas and natural gas liquids, while
an addition to the statutory language, is consistent with the legal
definition of "mineral" as developed in Kentucky's common
law.97 Finally, the bill would have classified mineral property in
terms of "unmined minerals," "active mining property," "ac-
tive reserves," "inactive reserves," and "barren or mined-out
property.''98 These classifications would affect assessments of
the mineral property, and thus the ultimate tax on the parcel.
The proposed legislation also provided for deleting the cur-
rent KRS section 132.020(5), which sets the ad valorem tax rate
for unmined coal.9 It is significant to the discussion of this
legislative proposal that the rate established by KRS section
132.020(5) applies only to unmined coal and not to all unmined
minerals. The actual result which would have been achieved by
" KRS § 132.020(1); see also H.B. 92; and see supra notes 8 and 93.
" At present, the statutory definition of real property is "all lands within this
state and improvements thereon." KRS § 132.010(3) (1984). The proposal would have
altered the definition to include:
[AIll forms of minerals which have not yet been mined or removed from
the earth for which there exists a method of extraction of the unmined
mineral in common usage in the industry and a commercial use for which
the mined mineral would be devoted under available technologies, including
oil, natural gas and natural gas liquids. H.B. 92, § 1(18) (1984).
H.B. 92, § 1(3) (1984).
See H.B. 92, § 1.
' See generally Scott v. Laws, 215 S.W.2d 81, 82 (Ky. 1919).
See H.B. 92, § 1.
KRS § 132.020(5) (1984) reads: "Unmined coal and any interest therein, in
whatever form held, including but not limited to leasehold and royalty interests, shall
be taxed at the rate of one-tenth of one cent ($0.001) per one hundred dollars of assessed
value."
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deletion of this section of the property tax statute would be to
treat unmined coal the same as other real property for tax
purposes. Theoretically, only the rate on unmined coal would
have been increased by passage of this bill since other unmined
minerals are already taxed at the standard real property rate of
$.315 per $100 in value.100
The bill would have also removed the exemption from local
taxation which the legislature had previously established for
unmined coal.'0' Passage of the bill, therefore, would have al-
lowed county, city, school or other taxing districts in which the
unmined coal property had a taxable situs to levy additional ad
valorem taxes.' 1 HB 92 would also have required taxpayers to
file with their local property valuation administrator "any inter-
est in unmined minerals, oil, natural gas, or natural gas liq-
uids,"' '0 accompanied by all the same data as is presently required
of the taxpayer when listing tracts of land for tax purposes.' °4
In cases where the taxpayer might fail to list such interests, the
legislation also made provisions for filing an action for assess-
ment by the Revenue Cabinet. However, this provision would
apply only in cases where the owner of the unmined minerals
had no property interest in the surface estate.1 5
Additionally, HB 92 would have required the Revenue Cab-
inet to determine the fair cash value of the mineral properties
based upon the information provided by the taxpayer, taking
'- See KRS § 132.020(1) (1984). Section 171 of the Kentucky Constitution provides
that the General Assembly has the authority to exempt certain classes of property from
local ad valorem taxation.
,o, See supra note 65; see also H.B. 92, § 3 (1984).
See H.B. 92, § 3 (1984).
,0, Id. at § 3(12).
, Currently, KRS § 132.230 (1982) requires the taxpayer to list each separate tract
of land, the number of acres in each tract, the value of each tract, the improvements
thereon, the location, the extent to which the improvements increase the value of the
tract, and other factors relevant to determining the fair cash value of the property. The
proposal would have required the owner of an interest in unmined minerals, oil, natural
gas, or natural gas liquids to comply with this criteria as well.
M H.B. 92, § 5 (1984) (to amend KRS § 132.220) would have provided in pertinent
part:
[I]n the case of unmined minerals, where the owner of the interest in the
unmined minerals owns no interest in the surface, an action for assessment
shall be instituted by filing a petition and procuring constructive service
against the owner under the provisions of rule 4.05, 4.06, 4.07, and 4.08
of the Rules of Civil Procedure.
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into consideration the classification of the unmined mineral
property as established by the legislation's classification scheme
and the owner's records and maps.1°6 Other factors were also
listed in the proposal which would have to be considered by the
Revenue Cabinet in the determination of fair cash value, includ-
ing: sales of similar tracts of unmined minerals; current market
price for the mineral if extracted; Btu content; sulfur and ash
content of tested samples, if available; the degree to which the
unmined minerals and adjacent mineral properties are under
production, or could be put into immmediate production; and
the existence of any lease for the unmined minerals, including
royalty provisions.'° The bill further provided that the Revenue
Cabinet would be required to certify the valuation to the county
property valuation administrator who would then be responsible
for placing the property on the tax rolls and giving notice to the
property owner.1°8
Another new section would have been created by HB 92
which would allow the property owner to provide core samples,
test data, chemical analysis or other data regarding the unmined
minerals as evidence of their value if the data were verified by
an independent qualified geologist, chemist or other expert ap-
pointed by the Revenue Cabinet.'19 The new section would have
made provisions for revaluation of tracts classified as barren or
unminable which were later put into production and would have
required payment of property taxes for the two tax years prior
to production of the tract.110
The proposed legislation would also have provided a formula
for allocation of state funds from the tax on unmined minerals.
The section allowed for a portion of the funds to go to the
"restricted fund group""' for use by the Revenue Cabinet in
assessing unmined minerals. The remainder of the funds received
as taxes on unmined minerals would go into the "operating fund





KRS § 45.322(l)(e) (1982) provides: "Restricted fund group: This fund group
shall consist of appropriations and other receipts restricted as to purpose, and which by
statute or otherwise may not be included in the operating fund."
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group" for the general operations of state government." 2 Fi-
nally, HB 92 would have required the county clerks to provide
the Revenue Cabinet with annual lists of all transfers of unmined
minerals." 3
B. Issues Related to HB 92
Generally, proponents of the unmined minerals tax measure
raise two basic points: the need for state and local revenues, and
the fairness or equity which they feel should accompany the
taxation of mineral properties. Opponents base their arguments
on a different type of fairness argument: the inability to fairly
assess mineral properties, and the unfair tax burdens which
would be placed on the mineral industries by such a tax. Many
of the arguments on both sides are based on emotional or
political concerns since a tax issue such as this one does not
arise in, nor can it be solved in, a vacuum."
4
When considering the merit of legislation such as HB 92,
several of the difficult issues to resolve are definitional in nature.
Are minerals "property"? If so, should they be treated as per-
sonalty or realty?' What is included under the designation of
"unmined minerals"? How can the "value" of unmined min-
erals be determined? How should unmined minerals be classi-
fied?
1. The "Property" Issue
Passage of the proposed legislation would have broadened
the definition of real property to which the ad valorem tax
"12 KRS § 45.322(1)(a) (1982) provides: "Operating fund group. This fund shall
consist of all moneys, not otherwise restricted, available for general operations of state
government. It may include general funds, agency receipts, grants, and federal funds.
A separate record of each source of revenue within this fund group shall be maintained."
" H.B. 92, § 9 (1984).
'" While the scope of this note is limited to an analysis of the legal issues, the
political nature of this battle cannot be ignored. Thus, in the context of the legal
analysis, certain political issues will necessarily arise during the discussion of the legis-
lation debated by the 1984 General Assembly.
, I Many of the classification considerations discussed in this note are based upon
personalty considerations. However, it would not be too difficult to transfer these
concepts to realty if the earth itself were considered a class susceptible to division by
principles applicable to other classes of personal property. For purposes of this note,
the foregoing will be assumed.
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would apply."' As the statute is currently written, only "lands
within this state and improvements thereon" are subject to the
real property tax., 7 However, case law has long held that un-
mined minerals represent an interest in real property." ' Although
minerals in place are theoretically already within the scope of
the definition of real property without specific delineation as
such in the statutes, the vagueness of the statutory language
leads to confusion as to what actually comprises "real prop-
erty."
The property concept is obviously an issue which must be
clarified in the mineral context since it is clear that all interests
in property, unless exempted, must be taxed by the state. ",9 One
issue raised by the property concept is what exactly is to be
taxed? Proponents of this tax note common law precedent which
indicates that mineral interests are property interests.' 20 They
therefore argue that the value of unmined mineral property
should be subject to the applicable statutory tax rate.'
2'
Although the notion of a mineral interest being a property
interest has been an accepted part of Kentucky's law for several
years, taxation of these properties has never been as readily
accepted as is property taxation of other forms of property such
as homes and automobiles. Perhaps much of the resistance to
the imposition of a property tax on unmined minerals results
from the notion that ownership of mineral rights does not rep-
resent ownership of property but only represents the right to go
on to someone's land and produce the underlying mineral. Those
that hold this belief are able to accept the imposition of a tax
on the production of the mineral (the severance tax), but are
less able to accept taxation based on mineral ownership alone. 
22
A tax on production is considered appropriate taxation for coal
and other minerals because only when severed does the mineral
have a use. Surface estates, cars, and other such property, how-
,, See supra notes 94-98 and accompanying text.
' KRS § 132.010(3) (1984).
"' See, e.g., Williams' Adm'r v. Union Bank & Trust Co., 143 S.W.2d 297, 300
(Ky. 1940), citing Kincaid v. McGowan, 4 S.W. 802, 804 (Ky. 1887); cf. Ratcliff's
Guardian v. Ratcliff, 46 S.W.2d 504, 505 (Ky. 1932).
"9 See KY. CoNsT. § 171, supra note 11.
See Williams' Adm'r, 143 S.W.2d at 300.
Raydure v. Bd. of Supervisors, 209 S.W. 19, 23 (Ky. 1919).
'" Id.
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ever, are constantly used as a result of being subject to owner-
ship.
23
Such positions, however, may be countered by noting the
precedent in Kentucky that mineral interests are property.' In
Raydure v. Bd. of Supervisors,I the court made it clear that
"property" was to be given the very largest meaning by stating:
The term is therefore said to include everything which is the
subject of ownership, corporeal or incorporeal, tangible or
intangible, visible or invisible, choses in action as well as choses
in possession, everything which has an exchangeable value, or
which goes to make up one's wealth or estate. 26
This court noted, however, that while the word 'property'
was to be given a broad interpretation, "its use in taxing statutes,
unless limited by the words of the statute, covers and embraces
everything which is the subject of ownership and has an ex-
changeable value."'" The court further stated that "under our
constitutional and statutory provisions the word 'property' may
be said to only embrace that character or species of property
that has a cash value and may be subject to barter or sale."'12
Thus, while the court announced a broad definition for the word
"property," it appears to have also provided a limitation to that
definition: a limitation upon which opponents of the tax could
develop an argument.
For example, does the clause "unless limited by the words
of the statute," mean that the definition of real property is
limited to "land and improvements thereon"? It appears this
could be argued to exclude unmined minerals. But, if this is the
case, doesn't such a result conflict with the position that only
such property as is specifically exempted by section 170 of the
Kentucky Constitution may escape property taxation? Given the
nature of the holding in the Raydure case, it appears that courts
would tend to interpret any such exception very narrowly, and
statutory language which purports to limit the application of
In Interview with Thomas Duncan, President, Kentucky Coal Association, Lexing-
ton, Kentucky. (March 12, 1985).
" Williams' Adm'r, 143 S.W.2d at 300.
" 209 S.W. 19 (1919).





property tax statutes would be held to conflict with constitutional
provisions requiring the assessment and taxation of all prop-
erty.' 29 Thus, while there appears to be little legal authority on
which to base an argument that mineral rights are not property,
the addition of "unmined minerals" to the statutory definition
of "real property" as proposed by HB 92 would have removed
any basis for such a position, since it could no longer be stated
that the words of the statute limited the application of the state's
ad valorem tax.' 30
It is possible that an argument in opposition to unmined
minerals taxation proposals could be developed based on the
Raydure court's language regarding cash value. For example,
could this language serve as a limit on the application of the
property tax? It could be argued that the actual cash value of
the minerals cannot be determined until the mineral is mined
and sold, and thus only a severance tax is appropriate. 3' How-
ever, Raydure makes it quite clear that the constitutional test is:
"Has it a cash value of some amount? If offered for sale could
any bidder be found who would pay a cash price for it in any
amount? If so, it is subject to assessment."'1
32
It appears that any mineral tax exclusion based on the "no
cash value" theory would fail to pass constitutional muster since
it would be difficult to argue that a total lack of cash value
This position is dearly supported by decisions handed down since the early
Raydure court announced the broad construction for the tern "property" as related to
taxation. Raydure, 209 S.W. at 23.
I" It could be argued, however, that the taxation would not be an ad valorem
taxation because it would not be a tax levied on value but rather one levied on quantity
or measurement. If such an arguement could be established, there could be a question
of whether or not this would meet the constitutional requirements of property taxation.
,,, Stephens, Taxation of Coal Lands in Kentucky, Ky. Coal Journal, March 1983,
at 7 (stating that the tax assessor must be able to determine "the present value of the
right to receive a one time payment for this coal at some date in the future ..... )
In assessing this fair market value, many factors must be considered:
(a) the height, or thickness of the seam, (b) the quality of the coal, (c) the
amount of impurities present and whether the coal will require cleaning,
and if so, the equipment needed, (d) the location of the coal with respect
to the railhead or other means of transportation, (e) whether the quantity
available is in sufficient amount to justify the installation and equipping
of the mine, (f) an adequately trained labor supply, and (g) whether there
is a present and future market for the coal sufficient to justify the necessary
investment.
Id.
"2 Raydure, 209 S.W. at 23.
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exists for the property. While the cash value of unmined minerals
is difficult to determine accurately, while the further taxation of
these properties would no doubt serve to significantly lower the
property's value, and while it has been argued that under certain
market and regulatory scenarios a property may be "worthless,"
the constitutional standard as set forth in Raydure would make
a finding of no cash value very unlikely.
2. What Are "Unmined Minerals"?
Once the "property" issue is settled, the question becomes
what should be included within the definition of "unmined
minerals." HB 92 addressed those minerals "for which there
exists a method of extraction ... in common usage in the
industry and a commercial use for which the mined mineral
could be devoted .... ,,"3 Arguably, this definition would ex-
clude from the reaches of the property tax such resources as oil
shale and tar sands since the mining and utilization of these
resources is not a method of extraction in common usage in the
industry. It could also be maintained that there is not a com-
mercial use to which those mined minerals would be devoted.
Therefore, it is possible that Kentucky's vast oil shale and tar
sand reserves, presently held by oil companies and other devel-
opers interested in these resources, would escape taxation under
this definition. If these minerals do not fit under the definition
and are thus excluded, how would such an exclusion square with
constitutional provisions requiring taxation of all property?'4
3. Property Classification Scheme
Under HB 92, the application of the various definitions
would have created a scheme by which the mineral property
would be classified into one of four categories, depending upon
the owner's determination and reporting of the potential pro-
ductivity of the parcel. The categories included in the proposal
were "active mining property," "active reserves," "inactive re-




serves," and "barren or mined-out" property.' 35 These defini-
tional categories would then be taken into consideration in the
determination of the "actual value of mineral properties" for
taxation purposes.'3 The proposed creation of these statutory
classifications and their application in determining tax assess-
ments resulted in charges of discriminatory classifications and a
non-uniform taxing scheme in contravention of the state and
U.S. constitutions.'1 Specifically, it is argued that the classifi-
cation scheme, in application, would allow classification based
on type of ownership and on owners' intentions regarding the
property.
The requirements regarding uniformity which are imposed
by the Kentucky Constitution mandate uniformity "upon all
property of the same class' 1 38 but do not require all property to
be "of the same class.' 1 3 9 The constitution in fact specifically
authorizes classification of property for ad valorem state taxa-
tion by the General Assembly.14' Case law interpretations of this
provision have made it clear that the manner of classifying
property for tax purposes is left to the legislature, and as long
as the classifications are not arbitrary or unreasonable, they will
be upheld by the courts. 14' Thus, for these classifications to be
struck as unconstitutional by the reasonableness standard, op-
ponents to the proposal would have to show the classifications
to be unreasonable and arbitrary on their face or in their appli-
cation.
Opponents of the proposed measure have stated that these
classifications are being used to mask the fact that the drafters
of the proposal are interested in exempting small landowners
from the reach of this tax. 42 However, "[tihe fact that a statute
,3, Id. at § 1(18-22). These four classifications would have been for purposes of
valuation based on productive potential or capacity. Such classification would have
resulted in differing valuations for the different categories.
" H.B. 92, § 6(2) (1984).
'3" See supra notes 65-73 and accompanying text.
m Ky. CONST. § 171. (Emphasis supplied).
139 Id.
140 Id.
"I Burge, 394 S.W.2d at 909.
,,2 It is unclear from the wording of H.B. 92 whether every owner of a mineral
interest would be required to drill and measure every tract of land which might contain
minerals-regardless of the geographic location. Carried to the extreme, this would
require every tract (whether agricultural, commercial, or residential, with severed or
unsevered interests) to comply with measurement requirements. In order to avoid this
dilemma, therefore, any unmined mineral tax proposal must of necessity contain an
extensive list of exemptions and exclusions in order to be workable. If the end result,
however, leaves only large corporations as the parties to be taxed, the tax could be
attacked as discriminatory.
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discriminates in favor of a certain class does not render it
unconstitutional if the discrimination is founded upon a reason-
able distinction or if any state of facts can be conceived to
sustain it." 43 Since the courts are unlikely to substitute their
judgement for that of the legislature in such cases, it would not
be difficult to establish some set of facts for upholding the
constitutionality of this classification, even if in its application
it tends to favor small landowners and farmers.;'" On the other
hand, it is not difficult to imagine such a classification running
afoul of the warning set forth by the U.S. Supreme Court in
McHenry v. Alford.'45 Specifically, property classifications based
on the ownership of the property will not be tolerated.
It appears that any classification scheme that is proposed
will be attacked on constitutional grounds. However, while a
variety of valid arguments exist in opposition to this proposal,
one based on an unconstitutional classification of property will
be more difficult to maintain because of the constitutional stand-
ard of the reasonableness which courts apply'" and because of
the courts' reluctance to interfere in legislative policy decisions.
4. Valuation of the Property
Another issue raised by this proposal relates to the require-
ment that the Revenue Cabinet determine the "fair cash value
of all mineral properties ... according to valuation methods
that fairly establish the actual value."' 47 A major argument in
opposition to a tax on minerals in place has always been that a
fair cash value for such properties cannot be determined due to
such variations in physical properties, location of the seam or
reservoir, market needs, the regulatory environment, mining
143 Kentucky Milk Mktg. v. Borden, 456 S.W.2d 831, 835 (Ky. 1970), citing Williams
v. City of Bowling Green, 70 S.W.2d 967 (Ky. 1934). In addressing the issue of a
purported violation of the constitutional prohibition of special legislation (see Ky. CoNsT.
§ 59), the court drew upon a number of previous legislative classification cases which
set forth the reasonableness standard in determining that the Kentucky Milk Marketing
Act did not represent special legislation. See also Reynolds Metal Co., 107 S.W.2d at
251; Second Street Properties, 445 S.W.2d at 709.
See Kentucky Milk Mktg., 456 S.W.2d at 836. See supra note 44.
'o 168 U.S. 651 (1898).
"'Burge v. Marcum, 394 S.W.2d 908, 909 (Ky. 1965).
H.B. 92, § 6(2) (1984).
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methods employed, or transportation requirements.'4 Further-
more, the legislation does not specify the type of valuation
methods which are to be utilized to "fairly establish the actual
value" of these properties. Since different methods of valuation
may lead to differing assessments, the potential for tax appeals
is tremendous. 49 In addition, some valuation methods are not
appropriate for assessing the value of unmined minerals. Op-
ponents note that the value of unmined minerals is a "potential
value" only and that taxing the owner of minerals for the
mineral's potential value is inherently unfair in that the property
could easily turn out to be "worthless" at some point in the
future after the property owner has paid substantial sums into
the state treasury.'" Arguments based on the inability to obtain
a fair approximation of actual value are among the strongest
arguments against this form of mineral taxation since the con-
stitutionality of a tax is based on the fair cash value standard.
At this point, the question becomes: Can an ad valorem tax
system be devised which will accomodate the seemingly incon-
sistent constitutional requirements that all property be taxed and
that taxes be based on assessments at fair cash value?
5. Evidence of Barren or Mined-out Properties
Another portion of the 1984 legislative proposal which caused
concern was the section which required independent verification
of the results of any core drilling offered by the taxpayer as
evidence to prove that minerals do not exist on a particular
parcel."' While the requirement for independent verification is
not particularly offensive in theory, the core drilling results
under this section of the legislation would have required verifi-
cation by "a geographical gamma-ray density log test performed
at the expense of the taxpayer by the department, or a qualified
engineer appointed by the department.... "12 Even if an "in-
dependent" verification was obtained, it could then only serve
as "evidence of value of the unmined minerals for the area
1, R. Crawford, Remarks before the Ky. Legislative Research Comm. on the
unmined minerals tax proposal (February, 1984).
" Id.
-50 Id.
See H.B. 92, § 7 (1984).
Id. (emphasis supplied).
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bounded by a one-quarter (1/4) mile radius of the core drill-
ing."5
3
In other words, even after the property owner has gone to
the expense of having a core drilling of the parcel taken, there
will be the additional expense of further tests. Since the results
of such tests can only be applied to a limited area of the parcel,
it is possible that extended logging of the area will even be
necessary. Obtaining verification of barren or mined-out prop-
erties could thus prove to be prohibitively expensive for many
property owners.
Therefore, even though property owners were convinced that
a parcel for which they are being assessed is barren, they might
not be able to afford to meet the standard of proof required to
avoid classification of the property as containing mineable re-
serves. Even if such property owners could afford such testing,
the cost could easily outweigh the tax liability, making it more
cost-effective for such taxpayers to pay the tax than to try to
provide evidence of the lack of minerals. Although equity and
fairness issues are raised by such a provision, there appears to
be nothing inherently unconstitutional about the mechanism.
CONCLUSION
The taxation of unmined minerals is clearly an issue of
considerable import to the mineral industries, the mineral pro-
ducing areas of the state, the Kentucky legislature, and the
people of Kentucky. Since the issue contains elements of policy,
law, economics, accounting, and even emotion, it cannot be
resolved through legal considerations alone-nor can it be re-
solved in a vacuum. Therefore, as a broad policy issue, it is a
controversy that the legislature will have to resolve. In spite of
concerns raised over HB 92, interest in the passage of such
legislation has not vanished. Drafts of substitute proposals were
already making their way through the legislative committee meet-
ings late in the 1984 session, and it appears likely that the 1986
session will be faced with similar proposals.
If legislative proposals similar to those which have been
discussed here are introduced again, it is likely that the necessity
"' Id.
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for additional revenue sources will weigh heavily in the outcome.
In its search for new sources of dollars, the Kentucky legislature
may well feel the need to pass an unmined minerals tax. As has
been shown, the Kentucky General Assembly clearly has the
authority to pass property taxation statutes and the power to
establish which property will be exempt from local taxation. The
legislature can also determine what rate of tax will be applied
to each classification of property.
Considering this list of legislative powers, an unmined min-
erals tax could become a reality in Kentucky unless the legislature
can be persuaded that it is against the best interests of the state
to do so, or unless opponents can successfully mount an attack
based on constitutional grounds.
J. E. Clark

